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Commercial Law
Robert A. Weber, Jr.*
I.

BANKING

A.

Loan Commitments
Loan commitments, as most first-year law students learn, must be in
writing to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, codified in
Georgia at O.C.G.A. section 13-5-30(7). Of course, that rule begs the
question of which written memoranda will qualify thereunder. In
Oceanmark Bank, FS.B. v. Stubblefield,1 the court found that a bank's
letter stating the borrower's loan application was approved did not
constitute a binding loan commitment under the Statute of Frauds
because it did not specify a maturity date.2 Further, the letter did not
include a provision pertaining to the rate of interest after the first year
of the loan. Because the letter did not show that an agreement had been
reached on all terms and conditions, "no enforceable loan commitment
was made."3
Similarly, the court in Kamat v. Allatoona Federal4 found that various
documents failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds in the loan commitment context.5 In Kamat plaintiff-borrower made an application with
defendant-lender preparatory to plaintiff's attendance at a condominium
auction. Plaintiff bid at the auction after being informed by defendant* Associate in the firm of Smith, Gilliam & Williams, Gainesville, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1991; J.D., cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994);
Editor in Chief (1993-1994). Law Clerk to the Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., United
States District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia (1994-1996). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
As with last year's article, many thanks to my wife, Laurie, for all her support.
1. 230 Ga. App. 399, 496 S.E.2d 465 (1998).
2. Id. at 400, 496 S.E.2d at 467.
3. Id.
4. 231 Ga. App. 259, 498 S.E.2d 152 (1998).
5. Id. at 262, 498 S.E.2d at 154-55.
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lender that "their loan application was approved."6 In plaintiff's
subsequent breach of contract claim against the defendant-lender for its
failure to provide financing after plaintiff became contractually bound
to purchase the condominium, defendant-lender raised the Statute of
Frauds defense. Plaintiff responded by citing a letter from the lender
prior to the auction stating that plaintiff's loan application was
"approved."' Plaintiff also cited a good faith estimate of closing costs,
which set forth "the loan amount and the interest rate for an FHA
insured adjustable mortgage."' The court held that neither of these
documents satisfied the Statute of Frauds.? As to the first document,
the court noted the letter listed defendant's reasons for being unable to
provide plaintiff with financing, and therefore, the letter could not be
viewed as a loan commitment.' ° Further, the reference in the letter to
an earlier loan approval was, at most, a reference to the lender's oral
commitment. 1 Finally, the good faith estimate, although containing
the terms of the proposed loan, contained no written commitment by
defendant to make the loan. 2
Finally, the court in Georgia First Bank v. Mathis 3 demonstrated
that Georgia courts remain reluctant to force a lender to extend credit
under a loan commitment when the borrower fails to adhere to the terms
of the commitment. In Mathis the bank issued a five-page commitment
letter to the borrower, who proposed to construct an amusement park.
Signed by both parties, the letter listed five situations under which the
bank could cancel the commitment to loan the money. One of these
grounds was the occurrence of "any adverse change with respect to the
project, the collateral, or other source of repayment." 4
When the bank issued the letter, it did so in contemplation of
receiving a first lien position on borrower's residence, even though the
bank knew at the time that another lender had a first position. When
the bank learned that the holder of the first position would not
subordinate as the borrower had indicated, the bank was entitled to
cancel the commitment because "the absence of this security was
material." 5 The court thus found that an "adverse change" had

S.E.2d at
S.E.2d at
S.E.2d at
at 155.
S.E.2d at

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 261, 498
Id. at 262, 498
Id. at 261, 498
Id., 498 S.E.2d
Id. at 262, 498

11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id., 498 S.E.2d at 154-55.
227 Ga. App. 769, 490 S.E.2d 439 (1997).
Id. at 770, 490 S.E.2d at 441.
Id. at 772, 490 S.E.2d at 442.

154.
154.
154.
154.
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occurred "with respect to the project, the collateral, or other source of
repayment."' 6 Regrettably, the court refused to address the bank's
argument that the commitment was not an enforceable contract."' Had
it chosen to do so, the court could have provided valuable guidance to
those drafting such documents.
B.

UCC Issues

The court in Weldon v. Trust Co. Bank, N.A.' addressed issues
"concerning the circumstances under which payment on a cashier's check
may be stopped by either the bank issuing the check or the remitter,
who is one who purchases a cashier's check payable to another party."9
The court began its discussion by differentiating between a cashier's
check, which is a "check drawn by a bank on itself," and a certified
check, which is "a personal check that a bank has accepted."2 ° In
Weldon an individual who wished to purchase goods from seller
deposited funds into his mother's account at defendant-bank. On March
23, 1995, the mother purchased a cashier's check from the bank with
those funds. Four days later the son's agent delivered the cashier's
check to the seller, who released and shipped the goods in reliance of the
cashier's check. The next day the son contacted the bank to request a
stop payment on the cashier's check because the goods were defective.
Although the bank initially stopped payment and dishonored the
cashier's check, it subsequently paid the item upon learning from the
seller's bank that the check had in fact been delivered to the seller.2 '
The question was whether a cashier's check, like a certified check,
"operates as an assignment of funds to the payee."22 The court began
by noting that although a majority of commentators disagree, Georgia
courts subscribe to "the view that a cashier's check is the equivalent of
a certified check" and that "[c]ases subsequent to Wright hold that a
cashier's check is accepted in advance by the act of its issuance and
operates an assignment of funds to the payee."23 Accordingly, the stop24
payment order came too late under O.C.G.A section 11-4-303(1).
"When the money was withdrawn from [the mother's] account and the

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 778, 490 S.E.2d at 441.
Id.
231 Ga. App. 458, 499 S.E.2d 393 (1998).
Id. at 458, 499 S.E.2d at 394.
Id. at 460, 499 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 458-59, 499 S.E.2d at 394-95.
Id. at 460, 499 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 460-61, 499 S.E.2d at 395-96 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 463, 499 S.E.2d at 397.
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cashier's check was issued in [seller's] name, it became [seller's]
property. [The mother] could not recall the cashier's check or stop
payment on it."25 Because prerevision statutes applied, the court did
not indicate whether its holding in Weldon would be binding under the
1996 version of Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") Articles 3 and 4.
In Vickers v. Broxton State Bank,26 the issue was whether a bank had
exhibited the "good faith" that is a prerequisite to the sixty-day
statement rule in O.C.G.A. section 11-4-406.27 Plaintiff and his partner
maintained an account with defendant-bank. Although the account
could only properly be drawn upon by items containing the signatures
of both plaintiff and his partner, the bank paid several thousand dollars
in checks signed only by plaintiff's partner. The bank defended its
actions under O.C.G.A. sections 11-4-406 (1) and (4), which provide that
a customer may not recover against the bank for improperly paid items
when the bank sent an account statement accompanied by items paid in
"good faith," and the customer does not discover and report any
improperly paid items within sixty days from such statement. 8 The
trial court granted the bank partial summary judgment based on this
defense.2 9
On appeal, plaintiff argued he was entitled to have a jury determine
whether the bank had paid the improperly signed checks in "good
faith."" The court of appeals disagreed, noting that "issues of good
faith [did] not always present jury questions."3' The court of appeals
found that although evidence showed plaintiff "was a new customer of
the bank, and the bank had a long-term relationship with his partner,
this relationship [gave] rise to no inference that the bank treated him
dishonestly."32 Further, "any bad faith the bank exhibited after
[plaintiff] notified it of the errors [was] immaterial because '[tihe
transactions regarding which lack of good faith must be shown are
paying the checks and debiting [the] account.""'3 Therefore, grant of
partial summary judgment to the bank was proper.3 4

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 461, 499 S.E.2d at 396 (footnote omitted).
230 Ga. App. 170, 495 S.E.2d 645 (1998).
Id. at 171, 495 S.E.2d at 646.
Id. at 170-71, 495 S.E.2d at 646.
Id. at 171, 495 S.E.2d at 646.
Id.
Id., 495 S.E.2d at 647.
Id. at 172, 495 S.E.2d at 647.
Id.
Id.
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The court in Summit Transportation Services, Inc. v. NationsBank
(South), N.A. 8 also addressed issues pertaining to a bank's "statement"
defense under O.C.G.A. section 11-4-406. First, the court held that
sending only imaged copies of paid items to a customer constituted a
"reasonable manner" of making items available to its customer under
O.C.G.A. section 11-4-406(1). s6 Second, the court addressed the
quantum of evidence necessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate that its
bank was negligent in honoring forged checks. 7 In Summit the bank
was unable to produce (1) documentary evidence explaining its policies
in verifying signatures on checks, (2) signature cards or the depository
agreement with plaintiff, or (3) any witness to explain its verification
procedures.38 Therefore, the bank failed to show that it had complied
with industry standards and "exercised the requisite degree of ordinary
care in processing [plaintiff's] checks." 9 In addition, the court found
that the standard for determining the bank's negligence within the sixtyday period was the same as that for determining the bank's negligence
under the fourteen-day period set forth in O.C.G.A. section 11-4406(3).40
As a final note on UCC issues, the court in Jurisco, Inc. v. Bank
South, N.A. 41 addressed two issues pertaining to an issuer-bank's
obligation under a letter of credit. The letter of credit in Jurisco
required "a signed written statement from an authorized officer" of the
beneficiary of the letter of credit, for a valid draw to be made. 42 The
beneficiary was in receivership, and the question was whether the
receiver was "an authorized officer" under the terms of the letter of
credit. 43 Noting that there was no Georgia precedent on this issue, the
court found that substantial rather than strict compliance under the
terms of a letter of credit was the applicable standard." Therefore, the
court held that the beneficiary's receiver was an "authorized officer"
"entitled to make a demand for payment on the letter of credit."45 The
court also addressed the independence principle, which states that a
"bank's obligation to the beneficiary is independent of the beneficiary's

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

232 Ga. App. 8, 500 S.E.2d 911 (1998).
Id. at 10, 500 S.E.2d at 913.
Id. at 10-11, 500 S.E.2d at 913.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11, 500 S.E.2d at 914.
228 Ga. App. 799, 492 S.E.2d 765 (1997).
Id. at 801, 492 S.E.2d at 767.
Id.
Id. at 802, 492 S.E.2d at 768.
Id. at 803, 492 S.E.2d at 768.
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performance on the underlying contract. Put another way, the issuer
must pay on a proper demand from the beneficiary even though the
beneficiary may have breached the underlying contract with the
applicant."46 The. question was whether Georgia recognized a fraud
exception to the independence principle.4 7 The court stated that the
type of fraud required to enjoin payment on a letter of credit must be
"fraud so serious as to make it obviously pointless and unjust to permit
the beneficiary to obtain the money ....Where the beneficiary's conduct
has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the
independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be served
Because there was no evidence that the beneficiary "ever
misrepresented ... the amount actually owed," the fraud exception to
the independence principle did not apply.49
C.

Account Management Issues

The survey period produced a decision addressing allegations that a
bank was negligent in opening an account. In Nicholl v. NationsBank
of Georgia, N.A.,' ° plaintiff lost his wallet, which included his driver's
license, social security card, and other items of identification. Plaintiff
discovered that an imposter had opened an account in plaintiff's name
with defendant-bank. Plaintiff made this discovery after the imposter's
handling of the account resulted in an adverse credit rating for plaintiff.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank on plaintiff's
claim that the bank had negligently opened the account in his name.51
The court of appeals affirmed." Although none of the documents in
plaintiff's lost wallet had the address or telephone numbers that were on
the checks printed for the imposter's account, and although the
signatures on the checks differed from plaintiff's real signature, the
court of appeals found the evidence insufficient to support a negligence
claim."' In particular, the evidence revealed nothing about what
identification, stolen or forged, the imposter presented to the bank in
opening the account. Further, the record contained no evidence that
plaintiff attempted to obtain through discovery "more specific information about [the bank's] conduct in opening the account."54 However, the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id., 492 S.E.2d at 768-69.
Id. at 804, 492 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 803-04, 492 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 803, 492 S.E.2d at 769.
227 Ga. App. 287, 488 S.E.2d 751 (1997).
Id. at 287, 488 S.E.2d at 752.
Id.
Id. at 288-89, 488 S.E.2d at 753.
Id. at 289, 488 S.E.2d at 753.
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court indicated that such a claim might be supported by expert
testimony on what would be a reasonable identification policy for a bank
to have.5
Joint and survivor accounts under O.C.G.A section 7-1-813 also
received treatment during the survey period. In Bradshaw v. McNeill, 8 decedent created several joint accounts with plaintiff prior to
decedent's death. Approximately one month prior to her death, decedent
executed a power of attorney in favor of defendant, specifying that any
activity undertaken by defendant was to be taken on decedent's behalf.
Upon learning of the joint accounts between decedent and plaintiff,
defendant liquidated these joint accounts and created new joint accounts
between herself and decedent using the power of attorney. Plaintiff
learned of this after decedent's death and sued defendant to recover the
sums that
had originally been in a joint account between plaintiff and
57
decedent.

The court began its analysis by noting that the power of attorney,
which required any activity be taken on behalf of decedent, prohibited
any person acting thereunder "from benefitting from their position to the
principal's detriment."" In light of defendant's testimony that the
withdrawn funds were to be used to pay for decedent's care, and the fact
that decedent died without having an opportunity to ratify or repudiate
defendant's actions, a jury question existed on whether defendant was
acting on behalf of decedent or whether defendant exceeded the scope of
her authority by retaining the funds.5 9
The court of appeals also addressed joint-control agreements required
by sureties on guardianship accounts. In Traveler's Indemnity Co. v.
Trust Co. Bank,8 ° plaintiff-surety required a guardian to sign a jointcontrol agreement on the ward's account with defendant-bank, whereby
funds could be withdrawn from the account only by joint signature of
plaintiff and the guardian. Defendant-bank regularly sent statements
on the account to the guardian's address, which was listed as the
"account address" on the account application. 8' Plaintiff never requested monthly statements from either the bank or the guardian. When it
became apparent that the guardian had misappropriated the ward's

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
228 Ga. App. 653, 492 S.E.2d 568 (1997).
Id. at 653-54, 492 S.E.2d at 569-70.
Id. at 654, 492 S.E.2d at 570.
Id. at 654-55, 492 S.E.2d at 570.
228 Ga. App. 893, 495 S.E.2d 296 (1997).
Id. at 894, 495 S.E.2d at 298.
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funds, the probate couft required plaintiff to make the losses good.62
Plaintiff then sued the bank for violating the joint signature agreement
because the bank had paid checks bearing only the guardian's signature.6" After summarily dismissing the bank's argument that jointcontrol agreements violate public policy, the court proceeded to
determine the validity of plaintiff's claim in light of the "statement" rule
contained in O.C.G.A. section 11-4-406."' This rule provides that if a
customer fails to report an "unauthorized signature" within sixty days
from the time a statement is made available, it is precluded from
asserting such unauthorized signature in an attempt to recover against
the bank.65
The first question was whether plaintiff's "missing" signature
constituted an "unauthorized" signature within the meaning of O.C.G.A.
section 11-4-406." 8 The court concluded that it did, and that plaintiff
67
was a customer of the bank by virtue of the joint-control agreement.
Relying on New Jersey caselaw, the court held that the joint-control
agreement did not negate the operation of O.C.G.A. section 11-4-406. 8s
[Plaintiff] could easily have requested that [the bank] send it monthly
statements or could have asked [the guardian] to provide it with those
statements. [Plaintiff] apparently did not request any statements
during the almost four years after the account was closed, and it must
bear the burden of loss for its failure. 9
Under a convoluted set of facts, the court in Longino v. Bank of
Ellijay7° affirmed the principle that a "bank owes no legal duty to act

as a customer's legal or financial advisor."7 1 In Longino plaintiffattorney represented a physician, Fernandez, operating as Ellijay
Medical Center, P.C. In an attempt to gain control of North Georgia
Medical Center, Fernandez purchased three notes from the Bank of
Ellijay collateralized by stock in North Georgia Medical Center.
Fernandez financed the purchase of these notes by obtaining a loan from
the Bank of Dahlonega, using assets of his professional corporation as

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 893-94, 495 S.E.2d at 298.
Id. at 895, 495 S.E.2d at 299.
Id. at 895-96, 495 S.E.2d at 299.
Id. at 895, 495 S.E.2d at 299.
Id.
Id. at 896, 495 S.E.2d at 299-300.
Id.
228 Ga. App. 37, 491 S.E.2d 81 (1997).

71. Id. at 39, 491 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting First Union Nat'l Bank of Georgia v. Gurley,
208 Ga. App. 647, 648, 431 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1993)).
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a security interest. Plaintiff, as attorney for Fernandez and the
professional corporation, requested that the Bank of Ellijay redeem
certificates of deposit ("CDs") held by it and directed that the proceeds
from these CDs be placed in a cashier's check made payable to the
professional corporation. Plaintiff did this without realizing that the
CDs were actually held in the names of Ellijay Medical Center Profit
Sharing Plan and Ellijay Medical Center Pension Plan, both of which
were shielded from creditors (including the Bank of Dahlonega) by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Before plaintiff
or his client could take actual possession of the cashier's check, the Bank
of Dahlonega notified the Bank of Ellijay of its security interest in the
assets of the professional corporation. Because ERISA protection
evaporated upon conversion of the CDs into the cashier's check, the
Bank of Dahlonega received payment of these funds. After a malpractice
action against plaintiff resulted in settlement, plaintiff sued the Bank
of Ellijay alleging that it fraudulently failed to inform him of the ERISA
protected status of the CDs.72
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's award of summary
judgment to the bank.73 In addition to the fact that there was no
material misrepresentation by the bank, "there was no fiduciary or other
special relationship between the [plaintiff]" and the bank. 4 Plaintiff
"acted on information he received about the account from Fernandez and
not the bank. 7 5 Thus, the bank was "under no obligation to provide
[plaintiff] with information to which he had equal access, and under
such facts, [plaintiff] could not reasonably rely on any alleged representations or concealment of facts by the [bank]."76
II.
A.

DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP

Perfection and Priority

In JCS Enterprises,Inc. v. Vanliner Insurance," the court addressed
an issue of first impression in Georgia: the rights of a secured creditor
in insurance benefits payable from a third-party tortfeasor's insurer
upon the destruction of the collateral. Plaintiff sold a vehicle and
retained a security interest in it. After plaintiff had properly perfected
its security interest in the vehicle, the vehicle was totaled in a collision

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 37-39, 491 S.E.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 41, 491 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. at 39, 491 S.E.2d at 85.
Id. at 40, 491 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
227 Ga. App. 371, 489 S.E.2d 95 (1997).
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with a third-party tortfeasor. At the time of the collision, the purchaser
of the vehicle was in default on its obligation to plaintiff. As the
insurance company for the third-party tortfeasor, defendant paid
learned
insurance proceeds directly to the vehicle owner. When plaintiff
8
of defendant's payment, it sued defendant for conversion.1
The court began its analysis by stating that an "exercise of 'dominion
or control' over secured property which is 'inconsistent with' the rights
of the secured party is conversion."79 Because plaintiff's perfection of
its security interest was constructive notice to defendant, the question
was "when [was] the security interest extended to the insurance
payment" made by defendant.8 0 Defendant contended that its payment
did not become "proceeds" until it was received by the vehicle owner."1
According to O.C.G.A. section 11-9-306(1), "'Proceeds' includes whatever
is received upon the sale, exchange, collection, or other disposition of
collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to
the collateral is proceeds." 82 The court found that "although some
courts have interpreted UCC § 9-306 'to mean that proceeds do not come
into existence until they are received, the better view is that the right
to payment under the insurance policy is also proceeds for these
purposes and is subject to Article 9 of the UCC.'"8 3 Therefore, defendant was liable for conversion by making payments to the vehicle
owner.8 4 However, the court qualified its holding by stating that "the
failure to pay insurance proceeds to a secured party would not in all
cases constitute conversion." 5 For example, a different result might be
obtained if the terms of the security agreement between the debtor and
secured party allowed for the debtor to retain any insurance proceeds for
repair or replacement of the collateral. The court also suggested that a
different result might have been reached had the parties raised the issue
of O.C.G.A. section 11-9-306(3), which provides for a lapse in the
protection of security interest ten days after a debtor receives proceeds. 6

78. Id. at 371-72, 489 S.E.2d at 96.
79. Id. at 372, 489 S.E.2d at 96.
80. Id. at 373, 489 S.E.2d at 96.
81. Id.
82. Id., 489 S.E.2d at 97.
83. Id. at 375, 489 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting In re Reda, Inc., 54 B.R. 871, 875 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill.
1985)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 376, 489 S.E.2d at 98.
86. Id., 489 S.E.2d at 99.
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The court in Western Auto Supply Co. v. McKenzie17 considered
"which of two liens ha[d] priority on the proceeds sale of a [business]"
when the business had undergone a name change and a change in
corporate structure during the perfection period."8 Creditor A filed a
financing statement on all business assets of "John Hadden d/b/a
Western Auto Associates Store" on April 27, 1982. Creditor B also filed
a financing statement naming the same debtor on December 31, 1986.
On January 12, 1987, debtor incorporated under the name WASLA, Inc.
Creditor A filed a new financing statement, naming WASLA, Inc. as
debtor, on March 23, 1987, on all of the business assets of WASLA, Inc.
Creditor B filed another financing statement on July 15, 1988, naming
"John Hadden d/b/a Western Auto Associates Store" as debtor. On
January 9, 1992, WASLA, Inc. was administratively dissolved. Creditor
A's 1987 financing statement was continued on October 4, 1991, and
Creditor B's 1988 financing statement was continued on March 25, 1993.
On August 30, 1994, the store was sold. In that transaction, "John
Hadden, d/b/a Western Auto" was listed as seller, and bills of sale were
executed by both WASLA and John Hadden."9 The trial court found
that Creditor B had the superior lien, reasoning that as of January 9,
1994, (two years after administrative dissolution) WASLA, Inc. ceased
to exist, so that there were no assets to which Creditor A's lien could
attach. 90
The court began its analysis by citing O.C.G.A. section 11-9-402(7),
which states:
Where the debtor so changes his name, or in the case of a organization,
its name, identity, or corporate structure, that a filed financing
statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to
perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more
than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing
statement is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed financing
statement remains effective with the respect to collateral transferred
by the debtor even though the secured party knows of or consents to
the transfer. 9'
Creditor B contended that upon dissolution of WASLA, Inc., the
debtor's identity was changed to John Hadden, so that Creditor A's 1987
92
financing statement on WASLA, Inc. became "seriously misleading."

87. 227 Ga. App. 477, 489 S.E.2d 537 (1997).
88. Id. at 477, 489 S.E.2d at 538.
89. Id.

90. Id. at 478, 489 S.E.2d at 538.
91. O.C.G.A. § 11-9-402(7) (1994); 227 Ga. App. at 478, 489 S.E. 2d at 539.
92. 227 Ga. App. at 479, 489 S.E.2d at 539.
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Nevertheless, the court found that this did not "invalidate an otherwise
valid financing statement."" Under O.C.G.A. section 11-9-402(7), the
financing statement became ineffective only on "collateral acquired by
the debtor more than four months after the change."9 4 Therefore,
Creditor A maintained priority to the proceeds of the sale. 5
The court also considered lien priority in aircraft collateral. In
Southern Horizons Aviation v.Farmers & Merchants Bank of Lakeland,9 6 the competing lien claimants were an aircraft mechanic who
had initiated a lien foreclosure action in superior court, but who had
failed to record his lien with the FAA, and a bank that had recorded its
purchase money security interest with the FAA after the mechanic began
his lien foreclosure proceedings. The relevant dates and events were as
follows. On January 25, 1994, debtor executed a promissory note and
security agreement in favor of the bank that financed debtor's purchase
of the aircraft. Between January 29, 1994 and July 1994, the mechanic
made repairs to the aircraft. On July 22, 1994, the bank recorded a
financing statement in the superior court. The mechanic initiated lien
foreclosure proceedings in superior court during November 1994. Due
to clerical errors, the bank's financing statement with the FAA was not
recorded until December 1994 or February 1995. The mechanic never
filed his lien with the FAA.97 The court ruled in favor of the bank,
finding that "[a] mechanic's lien which has not been recorded with the
FAA is not valid."98
B.

Repossession

99
Lewis Broadcasting Corp. v. Phoenix Broadcasting Partners
addressed a creditor's attempt to obviate a debtor's right to redeem
collateral upon default under the terms of a security agreement.
Plaintiff loaned defendant $650,000, and in exchange received a
promissory note, a security interest in all defendant's assets except for
FCC licenses, and an option to purchase defendant's assets, including
All
the FCC licenses, upon defendant's default under the note.
documents were executed the same day as part of the same transaction.
When defendant defaulted on the note, plaintiff sought to exercise its

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id., 489 S.E.2d 539-40.
231 Ga. App. 55, 497 S.E.2d 637 (1998).
Id. at 55-56, 497 S.E.2d at 638-39.
Id. at 56, 497 S.E.2d at 639.
232 Ga. App. 94, 502 S.E.2d 254 (1998).
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option.' Defendant refused, and plaintiff sought specific performance
of the option. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant,
finding "the option agreement was an impermissible restraint on the
debtor's right to redeem its collateral upon default."' ° '
The general rule is that "an option to purchase collateral for a fixed
price upon default, entered into at the time of the original loan
transaction granting a security interest in such collateral, constitutes an
impermissible attempt to defeat the debtor's right to redeem the
collateral."1 0

2

The court indulged plaintiff's contention that an excep-

tion to this rule existed "whereby a borrower may validly waive the right
of redemption by entering into a subsequent agreement supported by
additional consideration." 0 3 Although an issue of first impression in
Georgia, the court found that "such an exception is not inconsistent with
the language [of prior case law], which states that 'any provision in the
mortgage at its inception which takes away the right of the mortgagor
to exercise his equity of redemption is void."'' 0 4 Nevertheless, the
option agreement before the court failed to qualify for the exception
because "the option agreement was part of the initial loan transaction
and constituted part of the consideration" for the loan by plaintiff.0 5
Plaintiff also argued that because it did not have a security interest in
the FCC licenses, defendant enjoyed no equity of redemption, and the
general rule did not apply.'0 6 However, because the option agreement
was not severable, and did not allow plaintiff to purchase less than all
of the defendant's assets, this contention failed.0 7
In Welch v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 10 the issue was whether a
creditor repossessing a motor vehicle was entitled to a deficiency
judgment.0 9 Under O.C.G.A. section 10-1-36, a creditor repossessing
a motor vehicle may not seek a deficiency judgment unless he notifies
the debtor of his intention to do so within ten days of repossession." 0
The debtor stated that he voluntarily surrendered the vehicle to the
creditor by returning it on May 31, 1995, although the creditor's records
showed it was returned June 6, 1995. On June 2, 1995, the creditor
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Id. at 94-95, 502 S.E.2d at 254-55.
Id. at 95, 502 S.E.2d at 255.
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Id. at 96, 502 S.E.2d at 256.

104. Id.
105. Id.

106. Id.
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Id. at 96-97, 502 S.E.2d at 256.
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Id. at 904, 490 S.E.2d at 207.
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informed the debtor by letter that he was in default and had until June
12, 1995 to cure. Two days later, the creditor sent the notice required
by O.C.G.A. section 10-1-36.1"
The dispositive issue concerned the date on which the ten-day period
began to run.112 Previous cases held that voluntary surrender will
trigger the ten-day period if at the time of surrender "the debtor was in
default, and the creditor had the right to repossess.""' The creditor
contended that it did not have the right to repossess, therefore the tenday period did not begin to run until June 12, 1995, the date it stated
it intended to repossess the vehicle." 4 The court rejected this position,
finding that O.C.G.A. section 10-1-36 does not "allow a creditor to
unilaterally 'toll' the ten day requirement."" 5 The court remanded for
determination of whether the debtor surrendered the vehicle on May 31,
1995, as he contended, in which event the creditor's June 14, 1995 notice
was untimely, or on6June 6, 1995, as the creditor stated, in which event
notice was timely."
C.

Fraudulent Conveyance

The survey period decision in Beeson v. Crouch"7 emphasized the
sine qua non of a fraudulent conveyance action-status as a creditor.
Defendant transferred patents to a trust that granted CLI, Inc. an
exclusive license to use the patents. Defendant then proposed a joint
venture to plaintiffs whereby the parties would market, use, and sell the
patents in conjunction with CLI. Plaintiffs invested over $300,000 in
the venture. Defendant then informed plaintiffs that the trustee had
canceled CLI's license, and that the venture was terminated. Plaintiff
contended that defendant's conveyance of the patents to the trust was
fraudulent and sought imposition of a constructive trust in their
favor."' Because plaintiffs "presented no evidence that they are or
have been creditors of [defendant] ... [and did not hold] demands
against [defendant] at the time the allegedly fraudulent conveyance
occurred," they lacked standing to pursue a claim for fraudulent
conveyance. 119

111. 227 Ga. App. at 904-05, 490 S.E.2d at 207-08.
112. Id. at 905, 490 S.E.2d at 207.
113. Id., 490 S.E.2d at 208 (citing Central Bank v. Williford, 192 Ga. App. 843,.844,386
S.E.2d 688, 689 (1989)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 904-05, 490 S.E.2d at 207-08.
117. 227 Ga. App. 578, 490 S.E.2d 118 (1997).
118. Id. at 578-79, 490 S.E.2d at 120-21.
119. Id. at 584, 490 S.E.2d at 124.
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS

Restrictive Covenants
A previous edition of this survey article claimed that attempting a
synthesis of Georgia caselaw on restrictive covenants in employment
agreements would be next to impossible.12 ° In Habif, Arogeti &
Wynne, PC. v. Baggett,121 Judge Beasley accomplished the impossible
by thoroughly discussing the state of the law in Georgia on noncompete
and nonsolicit covenants of shareholders in a professional corporation.
Georgia has traditionally distinguished between "covenants ancillary to
an employment contract, which receive strict scrutiny and are not bluepenciled, and covenants ancillary to a sale of a business, which receive
much less scrutiny and may be blue-penciled."122 The Supreme Court
of Georgia has also created an intermediate level of scrutiny "for
covenants ancillary to professional partnership agreements." 23 Such
covenants deserve treatment different from employment contracts,
because in the former, the consideration flows equally among all parties,
and each partner enjoys a bargaining position equivalent to the
partnership. 24 The principle inquiry in determining whether to apply
the intermediate level of scrutiny is the relative bargaining powers of
the parties. 125 To assess the relative bargaining power of the parties
in Baggett, the court considered the following factors: (1) length of
service, including the portion during which the party was a shareholder,
(2) the degree of management responsibility possessed by the restricted
party, (3) salary relative to other partners or shareholders, and (4)
whether other shareholders or partners had executed similar agreements
benefitting the restricted party. 26 Considering these factors, the court
concluded that the restricted party and the corporation were in an
equivalent bargaining position so that an intermediate level of scrutiny
applied. 127
Applying intermediate scrutiny to the covenant not to compete, the
court made the following holdings that are instructive for drafting of
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Robert A. Weber, Jr., Commercial and Banking Law, 49 MERCER L. REV. 95, 127
231 Ga. App. 289, 498 S.E.2d 346 (1998).
Id. at 289-90, 498 S.E.2d at 349.
Id. at 290, 498 S.E.2d at 349.
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Id. at 291 n.9, 498 S.E.2d at 350 n.9.
Id. at 291, 498 S.E.2d at 350.
Id.

208

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

such agreements. First, the court came as close as it could to giving an
absolute stamp of approval on a two-year duration period.12 Second,
the court rejected the defendant's claim that the seven-county territorial
restriction was overbroad as it prohibited him from working in counties
in which he had not worked on plaintiff's behalf in the two years prior
to his departure.'29 Under the lesser degree of scrutiny, "territorial
restrictions expressed in terms of a certain number of miles radius of a
city" are generally valid, and the focus is rather on "whether the
restricted area coincides with the territory served by the employer, not
by the employee."'
When considered in conjunction with a clause in
the covenant not to compete whereby defendant agreed "that the
covenant was 'reasonable' and that breach of the agreement 'would work
harm' to the partnership," the territorial restriction was valid.'
Third, defendant argued that the scope of prohibited activity was
overbroad because it "prevented him from accepting unsolicited business
and thus impinged on the public's ability to choose the professional
services it prefers."" 2 The court rejected this argument as being
founded on policy considerations applicable in the context of covenants
not to solicit, but inapplicable for purposes of assessing the validity of
activity-based restrictions in covenants not to compete. 3 ' "The key in
covenants not to compete cases is that the forbidden services or activities
cannot be performed in a certain territory; it is not relevant who the
clients are or what activities, whether soliciting or otherwise, occur
outside the territory."'14
The court separately analyzed the covenant not to solicit. As with the
covenant not to compete, the court found the two-year limitation
reasonable.'35 As for the territorial aspects of the nonsolicit covenant,
the court stated that such a covenant is "generally valid if it prohibits
soliciting clients of the employer whom the employee had contacted
during her employment with the employer, regardless of whether it has
a territorial restriction."3 6 Because the covenant not to solicit in
Baggett prohibited solicitation "only of the clients of [plaintiff] for whom
[defendant] had 'done substantial work, it could lack a territorial
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Id. at 292, 498 S.E.2d at 351.
Id. at 294, 498 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 293-94, 498 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 294, 498 S.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 295, 498 S.E.2d at 353.
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restriction and still be valid.""
Lastly, as to the scope of activity
prohibited, the court found that "prohibiting the solicitation and
diversion138 of clients is reasonable as is prohibiting the contact of
clients."
Any practitioner drafting a noncompete covenant for a member of a
professional entity should review Judge Beasley's opinion in Baggett. It
is replete with annotations of restrictive covenant cases. Regrettably,
the court did not need to reach the question of whether blue-penciling is
allowed under the intermediate level of scrutiny. Therefore, it remains
an unresolved issue.
In William N. Robins, PC. v. Burns,'39 the strict standard of
scrutiny applied to the employment agreement between a law firm and
an associate attorney. The agreement, which stated that its intent was
to comply with the Directory Rules of the State Bar of Georgia,
prohibited the associate from soliciting any clients if he left the firm, and
provided a fee structure for those clients who wished to have the
associate continue providing representation. However, the agreement
contained no limitation on duration."' ° The court found the agreement
unenforceable because it contained no term limiting its duration or the
area to which its geographic restrictions applied.'
The issue in Enron Capital v. Pokalsky was whether a choice of
law provision would be given effect in an employment agreement
containing restrictive covenants.
The employment agreement (1)
provided that the employee would not disclose any confidential business
information of defendant after leaving defendant's employ; (2) prohibited
the employee from competing with defendant for a period of one year "in
any geographic area or market where [defendant] conducts any business,
which may limit the employee's ability to engage in certain businesses
'anywhere in the world;"' and (3) stated that it was to be controlled by
Texas law."'
The court refused to give effect to the choice of law
provision, stating that "a Georgia court will not enforce the contract if
it is 'particularly distasteful.'""'
This contract was "particularly
distasteful" because its restrictions, which inhibited the former employee
from competing anywhere in the world in any capacity, are unenforce-

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 298, 498 S.E.2d at 355.
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227 Ga. App. 262, 488 S.E.2d 760 (1997).
Id. at 263-64, 488 S.E.2d at 761-62.
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able in Georgia. 4 5 The contract restrictions were further "particularly
distasteful" because they contained no time limitation and were
geographically overbroad.' 46 Pokalsky implies that a choice of law
clause, which selects the law of a foreign jurisdiction in a covenant not
to compete, will not be given effect to the extent that the law of the
foreign jurisdiction permits restrictions broader than allowed for by
Georgia caselaw.
Harville v. Gunter 147 assessed the validity of a covenant not to
compete in an employment agreement in terms of its territorial
restriction and scope of activities prohibited. The noncompete covenant
in Harville contained the following territorial restriction:
"Troup
County, Upson County, Pike County, Lamar County, Georgia, or any
town or city in such other county or counties as Employee may
hereinafter practice speech-language pathology in the employment of the
Employer.""4 ' The covenant further prohibited the employee "from
working as a speech pathologist with any person, organization, or at any
facility serviced by [employer] at any time during her employment [with
employer]." 4 0 This language was overbroad because of its reference
to "other counties" and "other facilities," both of which were open-ended
descriptions that prohibited the employee from determining the extent
of the prohibition at the time the agreement was entered. 5 ° The
covenant was also overbroad on the scope of activity prohibited.
Specifically, the covenant forbade the employee from owning stock in, or
serving as an officer or director of, a company providing speech
pathology services. This description was "very different from [employee's] work as a speech pathologist" with employer and was thus "broader
than necessary to protect the employer."' 51
B.

Terminable at Will Employment

The court in Simpson Consulting v. Barclays Bank 5 2 considered the
existence of a promissory estoppel exception to the general rule that
employment for an indefinite period is terminable at will. The court
found that no exception existed, holding,

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
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while the principle of promissory estoppel. . . "provides that, in certain
circumstances, the reliance by the promissee or third party upon the
promise of another is sufficient consideration, in and of itself, to render
the executory promise enforceable against the promisor, this principle
has no application ... where
the promise relied on was for employment
153
for an indefinite period."
IV.
A.

PROMISSORY NOTES AND GUARANTY

Prima Facie Showings and Representative Capacity

A holder of a promissory note establishes a prima facie case to recover
upon proof that the note is authentic, 'is signed by the maker, and that
the maker is in default."' In determining whether a maker's signature was in a representative capacity, practioners should first determine
the date of the signature. In Marek Interior Systems v. White," 5 the
court found that O.C.G.A. section 11-3-402, effective July 1, 1996, only
governs a maker's signature in a representative capacity made on or
after its effective date, because its adoption by the legislature "created
a substantive change in the law."5 ' As for a guaranty, it must be in
writing, and contain language whereby the purported guarantor agrees
to guaranty the debts of a specified person or entity.
B.

Defenses

1. Lack of Consideration. A review of the survey period decisions
shows that lack of consideration is the most popular defense to a suit on
a note. This is curious, as it seems to be the least successful. In
NationsBank v. Peavey,"7 defendant gave plaintiff a note secured by
an automobile. Upon his default on the note, defendant surrendered the
automobile to plaintiff. When plaintiff threatened to sue for a deficiency,
defendant signed an unsecured second note. Plaintiff sued to collect
after defendant defaulted on the second note, and defendant raised the
defense of failure of consideration. 5 ' However, the failure of consider-
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ation defense is unavailable "when the note has been renewed."159
Defendant admittedly signed the second note to avoid plaintiff's threat
of a deficiency proceeding. Taken in conjunction with defendant's belief
that a deficiency would exist following repossession, the court found that
"the second note was a renewal of the first note."16 ° A "renewal cuts
off all defenses of which the maker then had knowledge" at the time of
renewal, which in this case included the defendant's defenses "based on
the first note, on an alleged oral agreement with [Plaintiff], and arising
from the repossession and sale of the automobile."16
The court in Kenerly v. Bryant 6' addressed the use of parol evidence
to challenge the existence of consideration for a note. Defendant had
signed several notes reciting that they were given "for value received" in
favor of plaintiff in lieu of real estate commissions owed to plaintiff by
defendant.'6 3 The court conceded that use of the phrase "for value
received" was sufficiently ambiguous to "support the admission of parol
evidence regarding the existence of consideration."' 64
However,
defendant's parol evidence did not seek to contradict the existence of
consideration, "but rather [to establish] the existence of contemporane-65
ous oral agreements ... that the notes would never be enforced."
As "use of parol evidence for such a purpose
[was] improper," plaintiff
66
was entitled to recover on the notes.
Defendant in Miller v. Calhoun /Johnson Co.167 also defended a suit

on a note based on failure of consideration. Prior to execution of the
note, the maker was indebted to the holder for building materials sold
to him on open account. In exchange for the holder's execution of lien
waivers on the maker's construction projects, the maker executed a note
in favor of the holder to settle the unpaid account balance. When the
holder sued, the maker contended that holder had "breached its
agreement not to demand payment of the note until it conducted an
audit and review of the underlying account," and that this constituted
a failure of consideration. 1 68 The court rejected this contention, stating
that "'no consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation
thereon given in payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation
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of any kind."'169 Notwithstanding defendant's claims that he did not
feel that he owed the holder any money at the time he executed the note,
and that he only agreed to sign the note under protest, defendant
adduced no evidence in support thereof. Therefore, the defense of failure
of consideration was unavailable." °
The court's decision in Autrey v. UAP /GA AG CHEM, Inc. 7 ' demonstrated the futility of challenging the enforceability of a guaranty for
lack of consideration when the guaranty recites nominal consideration
and is executed under seal: "A contract under seal raises a prima facie
presumption of consideration, which is rebuttable. Thus, although a
contract under seal imports consideration, the defense of failure of
consideration can be asserted. However, any nominal consideration
72
recited in sealed instruments is sufficient as a matter of law."
2. Fraud. Makers during the survey period also defended actions on
the basis that notes or guarantees given by them were procured by
fraud. In Autrey a corporation was indebted to plaintiff for purchases of
fertilizer on an open account. The corporation claimed it was due a set
off on the account for damages suffered by it from defective fertilizer.
Plaintiff accepted a promissory note from the corporation for the balance
due on the account and a guaranty of the note by defendant, a corporate
principal. In exchange, plaintiff agreed to assist the corporation in
settling its claim against the fertilizer manufacturer. When plaintiff
sued on the guaranty, defendant claimed that he had been induced by
fraud to execute the guaranty, and that "the only reason he executed the
guaranty was because representatives of [plaintiff] agreed that in an
exchange for the promise 'it would arrange payment' for the crop damage
73
[the corporation] suffered due to the allegedly defective fertilizer."
The court rejected defendant's fraud defense, finding that the "alleged
agreement was simply too vague to establish fraud." 74 Because "the
alleged fraud was predicated on a promise which was unenforceable at
the 5time it was made," it was insufficient as a defense to the guaran17

ty.
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The fraud defense was equally unavailing to the defendant in Fuller
v. Greenville Banking Co. 7 ' Although defendant testified that "he 'did
not realize that the note required monthly payments' and that he
thought it 'was like the original [note] where [he] could pay the interest
at the end of the year or if [he] sold the lots,"' the note did in fact
require monthly payments.' 77 Notwithstanding defendant's testimony
on what he thought the terms of the note were, "[i]t was incumbent upon
[him] to exercise ordinary diligence to make his own independent
verification of the contractual
terms and his failure to do so bars an
178
action based on fraud."
Defendant in Peavey also defended on the basis that "he was
fraudulently induced to sign the note which plaintiff [sought] to
collect."'79 Defendant claimed that plaintiff's failure to inform him
that it was not entitled to a deficiency judgment for the balance of
previous note constituted fraudulent inducement. However, in light of
defendant's admission "that he took no steps to determine his rights
prior to the execution of the note," the defense failed.8 0
3. Laches. Kenerly also addressed the use of laches to defend
against enforcement of a note. The trial court had applied laches to
limit the amount of interest recoverable by plaintiff.'8 ' The court of
appeals reversed."8 2 An action on a note is an action at law, whereas
laches is an equitable defense inapplicable to actions at law.'83 Even
if the equitable doctrine of laches applied, it would be unavailable during
the statute of limitations period, which for notes under seal is twenty

years. 184
4. Duress. Defendants in Hovendick v. Presidential Financial
Corp.' 5 and Miller both raised the defense of duress based on their
respective economic distress. The court in both cases rejected the
defense, holding that "financial difficulties do not constitute legal
duress."'86

176. 230 Ga. App. 63, 495 S.E.2d 320 (1997).
177. Id. at 64, 495 S.E.2d at 321.
178. Id. at 65, 495 S.E.2d at 322.
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181. 227 Ga. App. at 747, 490 S.E.2d at 456.
182. Id. at 748, 490 S.E.2d at 456.
183. Id.
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185. 230 Ga. App. 502, 497 S.E.2d 269 (1998).
186. 230 Ga. App. at 650, 497 S.E.2d at 399; see Hovendick, 230 Ga. App. at 505, 497
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C.

Course of Dealing

Several survey period decisions addressed the impact of the parties'
course of dealing on the enforceability of a note or guaranty. In
Quintanilla v.Rathur,8 7 defendant purchased a medical practice from
plaintiff, and in connection therewith, the parties executed a purchase
and sale agreement and a lease for the office space, and defendant gave
plaintiff a promissory note for the purchase price. Although the
purchase and sale agreement contained a provision stating that neither
seller nor purchaser could recover damages from the other except
attorney fees, the note contained an acceleration clause. During the
course of the first three years, defendant only made sporadic payments
on the note. In plaintiff's suit on the note, defendant claimed that the
parties' conduct constituted a mutual departure from the note's payment
8
terms.1
The court disagreed, stating that "the earlier acceptance of some late
and irregular payments [does] not demonstrate a mutual departure
where many payments [are] missed altogether.""8 9 Although defendant
made a number of late and partial payments that were accepted by
plaintiff, he completely failed to make twenty payments.' 90 And
notwithstanding plaintiff's alleged statement that the financial problems
could be "worked out," there was no evidence that plaintiff had "agreed
to non-payment, as opposed to late payment[s]."' 9'
In Greenwald v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co.,192 a corporation
executed notes individually guaranteed by five of the corporation's
shareholders. The guaranty provided that (1) the notes could be
extended or renewed by the holder at any time, (2) the holder could
exercise its rights under the guaranty in such manner and sequence as
it wished, (3) the guarantors were jointly and severally liable, and (4)
the holder could compromise or substitute collateral. Two of the
shareholders-guarantors split from the corporation to form a new
corporation. Afterwards, the holder renewed the notes, and extended
additional credit to the debtor-corporation, notwithstanding the holder's
knowledge that the debtor-corporation's creditworthiness was rapidly
deteriorating.' 93 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor
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of the holder in its suit against the five guarantors, finding them jointly
and severally liable.'94
The guarantors who had split from the debtor-corporation prior to the
note renewal claimed that they should not be liable on the guaranty
because the holder had "propped up" the failing debtor-corporation with
the note renewal and additional credit extension and in so doing had
"favored the other guarantors and [the debtor-corporation] to their
195
detriment by failing to foreclose sooner on the secured collateral."
The court found this reasoning unpersuasive, as appellants had
consented "in advance to changes that [were] subsequently made."196
Further, even if the holder's conduct compromised or impaired the
collateral, it was not a breach of any duty of good faith because "a
contracting party cannot breach an implied covenant of good faith where
it has7 done what the provisions of the contract expressly permit it to
9
do."

1

Lastly, Puccini v. Thomas & Howard Co. 198 held that a change in
payment terms from C.O.D. to open account did not release the
guarantor of liability for the account balance, when "the plain language
of the credit and guaranty agreement authorized the [creditor] to change
the payment terms without affecting [guarantor's] liability."199
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